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ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ORDERS 
Susan Verdicchio* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The public, the courts, and the legislatures have all recognized 
that the integrity of our environment is a matter of public inter-
est. The comprehensive environmental protection scheme which 
has been created to protect that public interest impinges upon 
many areas of private conduct. Since the enactment of state and 
federal environmental protection laws, courts have faced the 
problem of providing a form of relief in individual environmental 
enforcement suits that is an appropriate protection of the public 
interest but which at the same time is not disproportionate to the 
actual conduct of particular defendants. 
One of the dilemmas of environmental enforcement is that a 
"punishment" does not seem to "fit the crime" unless it rationally 
responds both to private conduct and to the actual effect which 
that conduct has had on natural resources. Perhaps this is one of 
the reasons why large fines and criminal penalties have met with 
only limited acceptance and success. 1 While both seem reasonable 
mechanisms of deterrence, such penalties actually do little or 
nothing to rectify ecological damage. 
Since the first days of serious concern for the environment, new 
uses of traditional legal devices have developed to respond to 
environmental problems. In an effort to address this enforcement 
dilemma, courts have begun to use the little-known equitable 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COILEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. Execu-
tive Editor, 1984-85. 
1 See Reed, EPA Noncompliance Penalty Regulations Upheld, But Will They Be 
Applied? 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10104 (1983) (comment on Duquesne Light 
Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1983) which upheld regulations implementing a 1977 
amendment to the Clean Air Act, which provides for civil penalties calculated to elimi-
nate the economic advantage of delaying compliance with that law. See 42 U.S.C. § 7420 
(1982). 
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remedy of the restoration order.2 Equity will require restoration 
in order to end the operation of a wrong, or in order to prevent the 
continuance of a violation.3 As the term "restore" itself implies, 
this form of injunctive relief responds not only to an individual 
defendant's misconduct, but also to the consequences of that 
misconduct. A restoration order places the burden on the 
wrongdoer to take those affirmative steps that will, to the extent 
feasible, undo the effects of his wrongful actions. 4 
A court order that requires a defendant to remove soil contami-
nated with toxic chemicals or to restore wetland acreage exem-
plifies the general conception of judicial equitable power as "the 
instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the 
public interest and private needs .... "5 A restoration order actu-
ally remedies the ecological damage resulting from a violation of 
environmental law. An injunction to restore is not only "punish-
ment" that "fits the crime" but also a way of repairing the envi-
ronment and deterring future violations. 
Injunctions to restore are relatively rare in common law cases. 
Nevertheless, this form of equitable relief was used in common 
law trespass and nuisance.6 These tort actions developed to pro-
tect interests in land and were the precursors of modern envi-
ronmentallaw.7 A restoration order's ability to remedy a trespass 
or nuisance by requiring the defendant to fix a condition that 
wreaks continuing harm to land makes it an equally apt form of 
relief in cases brought under environmental laws. 
2 An injunction to restore is a type of mandatory injunction. Injunctions are judicial 
orders that can be either prohibitory or mandatory in form. A prohibitory injunction 
forbids a person from taking certain actions, while a mandatory injunction commands a 
person to take certain actions. Strictly speaking, an injunction granted as a final remedy 
is called a decree or permanent injunction. An injunction issued as preliminary or 
interlocutory relief is a preliminary injunction, order, or writ. The terminology used by 
courts varies. In older nuisance cases, "abatement" is used as a general term for 
injunctive relief. See 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1337 at 933-34, § 1359 at 
970 (5th ed. 1941); Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1055-61 
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Injunctions]. 
This article uses the terms "restoration order," "injunction to restore," and "restora-
tion decree" interchangeably to refer to a final remedy. 
3 4 POMEROY, supra note 2, § 1337 at 933-34, § 1359 at 970-72. 
• See Wheelock v. Noonan, 108 N.Y. 179, 15 N.E. 67 (1888). See infra text and notes at 
notes 47-52. 
5 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321,329 (1944). See generally Injunctions, supra note 2, 
at 1063-64. 
6 See infra text and notes at notes 35-60. 
7 See ROGERS, HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §2.6 (1977); United States v. 
Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1147 (D. Conn. 1980). 
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Courts have also recognized restoration orders as an appropri-
ate way to enforce state health and zoning laws in public nuisance 
actions.8 The remedy's ability to protect the public interest by 
ordering that the policies embodied in such laws be carried out 
can also be used to bring private conduct into compliance with 
environmental norms. 
With the enactment of environmental protection legislation, 
most current environmental litigation consists of statutory en-
forcement actions rather than common law nuisance cases. N ev-
ertheless, restoration orders ought to be available under envi-
ronmental statutes. The state legislatures and Congress intended 
to incorporate the full range of traditional equitable forms of 
relief in the judicial enforcement sections of environmental laws. 9 
The restoration order can be a principled, sensitive remedy for 
violations of environmental protection laws. 10 
This article will first look at the origins of the restoration order 
in traditional equity doctrine and in common law trespass, nui-
sance, and public nuisance. Since state and federal environmental 
protection statutes have largely displaced common law nuisance 
in environmental law, the article will then turn to restoration as a 
remedy in cases brought under environmental statutes. State 
courts readily apply nuisance precedent to interpret state envi-
ronmental legislation. The article will examine the types of state 
environmental cases in which restoration orders have been 
granted. The issues raised by the restoration order in federal 
environmental law are more complicated. The article will trace 
the injunction to restore in early federal environmental precedent 
and then argue that this particularly suitable form of relief con-
tinues to be available from federal courts in statutory enforce-
ment suits. 
II. RESTORATION ORDERS IN TRADITIONAL EQUITY DOCTRINE 
AND COMMON LAW ACTIONS 
Restoration orders are relatively rare. In part this is due to the 
notion that injunctive relief, particularly mandatory injunctions, 
is "the strong arm of equity, that ought never to be extended 
unless to cases of great injury .... "11 More important is the large 
8 See infra text and notes at notes 61-87. 
9 See infra text and notes at notes 226-76. 
10 See infra text and notes at notes 351-66. 
11 Truly v. Wanzer, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 141, 142 (1847). But see 4 POMEROY, supra note 2, at 
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role judicial discretion plays in equity.12 Traditional equity doc-
trine vests both the decision to grant or deny an injunction as well 
as the decision concerning what form an injunction will take with 
the court's discretion. 13 Courts reach these decisions by "balanc-
ing the equities" of each case. 14 Thus each result is closely tied to a 
particular fact pattern. Moreover, courts typically do not articu-
late why a particular form of injunction has been chosen. Indeed, 
equity has been criticized for being unprincipled and inconsistent 
because of the major role played by judicial discretion. 15 
Although restoration orders are rare, common law cases in 
which courts have granted this form of injunctive relief can be 
found. 16 The restoration order developed in common law trespass 
and nuisance, causes of action designed to protect land,17 and in 
public nuisance, a cause of action designed to protect public 
health and welfare. 18 Thus, it is from its origin in common law 
trespass, nuisance, and public nuisance precedent that the resto-
ration order's validity as an environmental remedy derives. 
A. Traditional Equity Doctrine 
The most basic principle of equity is that injunctive relief is not 
available unless a litigant has no adequate remedy at law. 19 
964-68. Pomeroy, whose treatise on equity was first published in 1883, commented that 
while courts continue to employ restrictive language about the availability of injunctive 
relief, "judges have been brought to see ... that the common-law theory of not interfer-
ing with persons until they shall have actually committed a wrong is fundamentally 
erroneous, and that a remedy which prevents a threatened wrong is in its essential 
nature better than a remedy which permits the wrong to be done, and then attempts to 
pay for it." Id. at 967. 
12 E.g., Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 551 (1937). See generally 
Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524, 533-45 
(1982); Winner, The Chancellors Foot and Environmental Law: A Call for Better Rea-
soned Decisions on Environmental Injunctions, 9 ENVTL. L. 477 (1979). 
13 See generally McClintock, Discretion to Deny Injunctions Against Trespass and 
Nuisance, 12 MINN. L. REV. 565 (1928); Injunctions, supra note 2, at 1063-69; Plater, supra 
note 12, at 533-45. 
14 E.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474, 476-78 (1915). See also Plater, 
supra note 12, at 535-46; Winner, supra note 12, at 484-510. 
15 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1974) (judicial discretion should 
entail principled application of standards, not equity which varies like the Chancellor's 
foot); see Winner, supra note 12, at 482 n.19. 
16 See infra text and notes at notes 35-87. 
17 4 POMEROY, supra note 2, § 1350 at 955 (nuisance), § 1357 at 964 (trespass). See infra 
text and notes at notes 35-60. 
18 See, e.g., Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 22 N.W. 641 (1885); see infra text and notes at 
notes 61-87. 
19 4 POMEROY, supra note 2, § 1338 at 936. 
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Monetary damages is the form of relief available at law. W Al-
though the basis for this rule is largely historical,21 the preference 
for legal remedies derives from a policy concern that equity's 
ability to affect conduct directly be used sparingly.22 Injunctive 
relief is considered extraordinary because it operates directly 
upon a defendant's future conduct, whereas legal relief is less 
obtrusive. Monetary damages merely equalize the consequences 
of a defendant's misconduct by compensating his victim.23 
A competing common law principle makes damages an inade-
quate remedy in many cases involving harm to land. Land is 
unique,24 and "[a] particular piece of real estate cannot be re-
placed by any sum of money, however large .... "25 The subjective 
value of a parcel of land to its owner is frequently incalculable, 
and this makes it impossible to fix compensatory damages. 26 Often 
it is impossible to determine the full extent of a continuing or 
recurring harm in a single lawsuit; an injunction will be appro-
priate in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits.27 Thus injunctive 
relief was often granted in common law cases involving harm to 
land.28 
An injunction is a judicial order that commands the person to 
whom it is directed to do or to refrain from doing a particular 
thing.29 Injunctions can be prohibitory or mandatory in form. A 
20 See Injunctions, supra note 2, at 997-98, 1001-04. 
21 Equity originated as an independent system of courts and arose to supplement 
common law during a period when that system was rigidly codified. Equitable remedies 
were available only if a given factual situation did not fit the requirements of a legal 
cause of action. See generally Winner, supra note 12, at 477. 
22 4 POMEROY, supra note 2, § 1338 at 935-36. 
23 See Boomer v. Atlantic City Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 370, 309 N.Y.S.2d 
312 (1970). See also Plater, supra note 12, at 540, where this proposition is framed as a 
question: "Will the court establish a rule for future conduct that prevents further tort 
injuries to the plaintiffs or relegate them to sequential damage actions?" 
24 Dickinson v. McKenzie, 197 Ark. 746, 752, 126 S.W. 95, 98 (1939). 
25 Lynch v. Union Inst. for Sav., 159 Mass. 306, 308, 34 N.E. 364, 365 (1893). 
26 Injunctions, supra note 2, at 1003. 
27 See id. at 1001. 
28 See Walsh, Equitable Relief Against Trespass, 7 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 56 (1929); Walsh, 
Equitable Relief Against Nuisance, 7 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 352 (1929); Van Heeke, Injunc-
tions to Remove or Remodel Structures Erected in Violation of Building Restrictions, 32 
TEX. L. REV. 521 (1954). 
29 Gainsburg v. Dodge, 193 Ark. 473, 479, 101 S.W.2d 178, 180 (1937). In his treatise, 
Pomeroy traces the term "injunction" to the "interdict" of Roman law. An interdict was 
the command which initiated a Roman legal proceeding. The most common general 
formula for this command was "vimfieri veto, exhibiteas, restituas," which translates to 
"I forbid you to use violence, you must produce, you must restore." 4 POMEROY, supra 
note 2, § 1337 at 933 n.l. 
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prohibitory injunction forbids someone from doing specified acts, 
while a mandatory injunction makes affirmative commands, di-
recting the persons named to take certain actions.30 While the 
prohibitory/mandatory dichotomy is mainly semantic,31 judicial 
reluctance to grant a mandatory injunction derives from the fact 
that any injunction affecting on-going conduct is more burden-
some than an injunction that merely restrains conduct that has 
yet to commence.~ Nevertheless, this reluctance was often over-
come by the need to protect land in trespass or nuisance cases, or 
to protect the public interest in public nuisance cases.33 According 
to general precepts of equity jurisprudence, then, mandatory in-
junctions to restore are an appropriate way to end a continuing 
harm or wrong. 34 
B. Restoration Orders in Trespass and Nuisance Precedent 
Trespass and nuisance are common law tort actions that pro-
tect interests in land.35 Trespass is defined as entry upon land 
without the owner's consent.36 Thus trespass focuses on the de-
fendant's conduct.37 A nuisance action, on the other hand, is less 
concerned with the defendant's actions than with the results of 
his actions. Nuisance is defined as unreasonable interference with 
a landowner's use and enjoyment of his property; actual physical 
invasion of land is not a necessary element of nuisance.38 
From the point of view of the landowner, trespass and nuisance 
protect distinct property interests. In a trespass action the land-
owner seeks to protect his exclusive possession of land, while in 
nuisance he seeks to preserve those qualities of his property that 
he values and uses. Of course, many conditions interfere with 
both of these interests. Flooding or covering the plaintiff's land 
with stones involves both a trespass as well as a deprivation of 
use and enjoyment.39 
30 See Injunctions, supra note 2, at 1061-63. 
31Id. 
32 Id. 
3.1 See infra text and notes at notes 35-94. 
34 See 4 POMEROY, supra note 2, § 1337 at 933, § 1350 at 955, § 1351 at 957, § 1357 at 964. 
35 PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 13 (trespass to land), § 87 (nuisance) (5th 
ed., 1984). 
36 Id. § 13 at 67, 70. 
37 Id. § 87 at 619. 
36 See id. § 87 at 619-26. 
39 See id. at 69-72; 624. 
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Restoration orders have been granted in trespass and nuisance 
cases where the fact pattern shows compelling harm to the use-
fulness of land.4O Generalizations about the factors governing the 
issuance of mandatory injunctions to restore are difficult because 
formulating appropriate injunctive relief is a matter for the 
court's discretion.41 Early court opinions in which injunctions to 
restore were granted do not carefully set forth the factors leading 
to the issuance of this form of injunction.42 
However, the cases do demonstrate that intentional wrongdo-
ing, bad faith, or even negligence on the part of a defendant are 
not prerequisites for a mandatory injunction to restore.43 Once 
the court has held that a trespass or nuisance exists, and that 
injunctive relief is appropriate, the court will shift the focus of its 
inquiry away from the defendant's conduct. Formulating the ap-
propriate injunctive relief entails a separate 'balancing of the 
equities.'44 To determine what form of injunction to issue, courts 
focus on the actual condition of the property.45 Courts often view 
different forms of injunctive relief simply as alternative ways of 
implementing a decision on the merits. If equity can enjoin con-
duct that causes flooding on a plaintiff's orchard, for example, it 
can also order "the removal of the means" which bring about the 
flooding.46 
40 See Learned v. Castle, 78 Cal. 454, 21 P. 11 (1889); Allen v. Stowell, 145 Cal. 666, 79 P. 
371 (1905); Shreck v. Coeur D'Alene, 12 Idaho 708, 87 P. 1001 (1906); Denver & Rio Grande 
W. Ry. Co. v. Himonas, 190 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir. 1951); McCauseland v. Jarrell, 136 W.Va. 
569,68 S.E.2d 729 (1952); Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty, 141 W.Va. 627, 92 S.E.2d 891 
(1956); Wilson Concrete Co. v. Sarpy, 189 Neb. 312, 202 N.W.2d 597 (1972); Franzen v. 
Dubinok, 45 Md. App. 728, 415 A.2d 621 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980). 
41 Webb v. Town of Rye, 108 N.H. 147, 153, 230 A.2d 223, 228 (1967) ("[O]nce a right to 
equitable relief has been established, the powers of the Trial Court are broad and the 
means flexible to shape and adjust the precise relief to the requirements of the particu-
lar situation.") 
42 E.g., Learned v. Castle, 78 Cal. 454, 21 P.ll (1889). 
43 Id.; see also Shreck v. Coeur D'Alene, 12 Idaho 708, 87 P. 1001 (1906) (defendant's 
attempts to mitigate conditions did not bar injunction against municipal dump). 
44 See Crushed Stone Co. v. Moore, 369 P.2d 811 (Okla. 1962); Riter v. Keokuk Electro-
Metals, 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957); Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 
F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1976). See also, generally, Plater, supra note 12, at 544-51: 
Analytically, [this] remedy decision involves a weighing of the comparative 
efficacy of available remedies rather than a comparative weighing of interests. 
Since the tailoring of remedies involves choices between options, shaped by the 
court's judgment about the practicalities and relative effectiveness of those 
options, it does no violence to the term "balance of equities" to include this latter 
balance within it. 
45 See, e.g., Wilson Concrete Co. v. Sarpy, 189 Neb. 312, 202 N.W.2d 597 (1972); Des-
berger v. University Heights, 126 Miss. App. 206, 102 S.W. 1060 (1907). 
46 Allen v. Stowell, 145 Cal. 666, 669, 79 P. 371, 372 (1905). 
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A restoration order also places the burden of rectifying harm on 
the wrongdoer. Wheelock v. Noonan,47 an 1888 New York case, 
provides an example. The plaintiff had informally given the de-
fendant permission to place a few stones upon his vacant lot 
temporarily, while the defendant completed some construction on 
his own land. When the plaintiff discovered that the defendant 
had blanketed six of his lots with boulders to a height of fifteen 
feet, he brought suit for equitable relief requiring the defendant 
to remove the stones.48 The defendant asserted that the plaintiff's 
proper remedy was at law. The defendant argued that an injunc-
tion was not justified because the plaintiff could remove the rocks 
himself and then recover his costs as damages.49 
The court rejected the defendant's legalistic distinctions be-
tween forms of relief on the grounds that such a doctrinaire 
approach would lead to an unfair and impracticable result. 50 
Under the defendant's approach the plaintiff would be required to 
find and rent another vacant lot and advance the costs of men 
and machines to move the stones. The court rejected this 
scenario,51 adding, "If any adjudication can be found throwing 
such burden upon the owner, compelling him to do in advance of 
the trespasser what the latter is bound to do, I should very much 
doubt its authority."52 
Restoration orders are common in another type of trespass 
action. Where the defendant has constructed a fence, wall, road, 
or building that extends beyond the boundary of his lot and onto 
the plaintiff's property, this continuing trespass is termed an 
"encroachment."53 Courts frequently require the defendant to 
remove an encroaching structure and restore the rightful bound-
ary, even where the defendant did not intend to appropriate the 
plaintiff's land and was simply mistaken about the location of the 
line; 54 This use of restoration orders is based on the uniqueness of 
47 108 N.Y. 179, 15 N.E. 67 (1888). 
48 Id. at 183, 15 N.E. at 68. 
49 I d. at 184-85, 15 N .E. at 68-69 . 
.. Id. 
5! Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Creely v. Bay State Brick Co., 103 Mass 514 (1870); Baron v. Korn, 127 N.Y. 225, 27 
N.E. 804 (1891); Pile v. Pedrick, 167 Pa. 296, 31 A. 646 (1895); Long v. Ragan, 94 Md. 462, 51 
A. 181 (1902); Hirschberg v. Flusser, 87 N.J. Eq. 588, 101 A. 191 (1917); Pradelt v. Lewis, 
297 Ill. 347, 130 N.E. 785 (1921); Ottavia v. Savarese, 338 Mass. 330, 155 N.E.2d 432 (1959). 
54 E.g., Creely v. Bay State Brick Co., 103 Mass. 514 (1870). 
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land; courts use this form of equitable relief because it is best able 
to preserve the integrity of the plaintiff's parcel of real estate. 55 
Courts view relief against an encroachment as incomplete un-
less it restores the plaintiff to full possession. 56 Anything less is 
often viewed as tantamount to allowing the defendant, a private 
party, to exercise the power of eminent domain by forcing the 
plaintiff to accep~ compensatory damages in place of a portion of 
his land. 57 If not removed, the encroachment can ripen into a legal 
right to continue to use the plaintiff's land. 56 An order requiring 
the defendant to actually remove the trespassing structure and 
restore the victim's property to its "former and usual condition"59 
fully resolves the dispute in a single action. The restoration order 
is practicable because requiring the defendant to undertake the 
necessary modifications himself avoids risking injury to other 
portions of his building and does not inconvenience the plaintiff.60 
C. Restoration Orders in Public Nuisance 
Unlike trespass and nuisance, the tort of public nuisance is not 
founded upon private property interests. The public nuisance 
action developed to protect essentially public rights. As defined in 
a Kentucky case, "A common or public nuisance is the doing of or 
the failure to do something that injuriously affects the safety, 
health, or morals of the public or works some substantial an-
noyance, inconvenience, or injury to the public."61 Restoration 
decrees against public nuisances are virtually as old as the cause 
of action itself. For example, a writ62 dating from 1532 ordered the 
Mayor of Oxford, England to clean the public streets and keep 
them clear of offal dangerous to the public health.6.3 
55 See, e.g., Lynch v. Union Inst. for Sav., 159 Mass. 306, 34 N.E. 364 (1893). 
56 See, e.g., Herr v. Bierbower, 40 Md. (3 Johnson Chancery) 456 (1851). 
57 Geragosian v. Union Realty Co., 289 Mass. 104, 109, 193 N.E. 726, 728, 96 A.L.R. 1282, 
1286 (1935). 
56 Id. 
5. Creely v. Bay State Brick Co., 103 Mass. 514, 516 (1870). Accord Gulick v. Hamilton, 
287 Ill. 367, 122 N.E. 537 (1919). 
60 E.g., Weis v. Cox, 205 Ind. 43, 185 N.E. 631 (1933). 
61 State v. So. Covington and Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 181 Ky. 459, 463, 205 S.W. 581, 583 
(1918). See generally Bryson & Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241 (1972). 
62 "Writ" is another term for injunction. See supra note 2. 
63 Frrz.HERBERT, NEW NATURA BREVIUM 185D, reprinted in RE, CASES AND MATE-
RIALS ON EQUITY AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 4 at 856 (5th ed. 1975). 
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More recent public nuisance cases typically involve a violation 
of a public health law or zoning code.64 Frequently such laws 
explicitly declare violations public nuisances.65 Mandatory injunc-
tions, including restoration orders, have been viewed as appropri-
ate ways of implementing the public policy embodied in such 
regulatory statutes.66 
As in trespass and nuisance, deliberate wrongdoing or bad faith 
on the part of the defendant are not absolute prerequisites for a 
restoration order in public nuisance.67 The character of the defen-
dant's conduct is more relevant to the determination of whether 
he is liable for a public nuisance. The type of injunction to grant, 
once liability has been established, is a separate issue determined 
by a separate 'balancing of the equities.'68 A mandatory injunction 
to restore may be the most practicable way to protect the public 
interest.69 Mandatory injunctions to restore are not confined to 
public nuisance actions brought on behalf of the government, but 
are also appropriate in suits brought by individuals.70 
64 E.g., Board of Health of Lyndhurst v. United Cork Co., 116 N.J. Eq. 4, 172 A. 347 
(1934); Goldsmith & Powell v. Texas, 159 S.W.2d 534 (1942). 
65 E.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 750.14 (Purdon 1977), which reads "A violation of [the 
Pennsylvania Sewage Facilities Act] shall constitute a nuisance and shall be abatable in 
the manner provided by law." See generally Bryson & Macbeth, supra note 61, at 246-47. 
66 Village of Pine City v. Munch, 42 Minn. 342, 44 N.W. 197 (1890) (municipality may 
obtain that injunctive relief which may be necessary to abate public nuisance of flood-
ing); Pennsylvania ex rei. Chidsey v. Black, 363 Pa. 231, 69 A.2d 376 (1949) (state not 
limited to one remedy but may obtain injunction ordering removal of mine waste causing 
contamination of streams); Cohen v. Rosedale Realty Co., 120 Misc. 416, 199 N.Y.S. 4, 
aff'd 206 A.D. 681, 199 N.Y.S. 916 (1923) (dictum) (injunction available even if writ of 
mandamus compelling the taking down of a building erected in violation of zoning could 
also be issued) ; Town of Grundy v. Marion, 231 Iowa 425, 1 N.W.2d 677 (1942) (injunction 
requiring junkyard owner to remove junk from yard whose location violated zoning). 
Public nuisance cases involving harm to land are relatively uncommon. Most of the 
authority supporting injunctive relief against statutory nuisances consists of cases 
enforcing laws against gambling, prostitution, or the manufacture and sale of liquor; 
these public nuisance cases have no factual similarity with environmental cases. See, 
e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,672-73 (1887). 
61 Mills County v. Hammack, 200 Iowa 251, 202 N.W. 521 (1925) (injunction to abate 
obstruction of a river by removing a dam). 
68 Costas v. City of Fond Du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 129 N.W.2d 217 (1964) (form of 
injunction depends upon the needs of the case). See generally Note, Environmental 
Law-The Nuances of Nuisance in a Private Action to Control Air Pollution, 80 W. VA. L. 
REV. 48, at 72-80 (1977). 
69 See Pennsylvania ex rei. Chidsey v. Black, 363 Pa. 231, 69 A.2d 376 (1949); Clearview 
Land Development Co. v. Commonwealth, 15 Pa Commw. 303, 327 A.2d 202 (1974). 
10 See Weinstein v. Lake Pearl Park, Inc., 347 Mass. 73, 196 N.E.2d 638 (1964) (injunc~ 
tion requiring defendant to move drainage culvert back to original location and remove 
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Welton v. Forty East Oak Street Building Corp. 71 was a public 
nuisance action in which a mandatory injunction was issued to 
remedy a zoning violation. The defendant's building violated a 
1934 Chicago zoning requirement that tall buildings be set back 
from the perimeter of the lot in order to preserve urban light and 
air. 72 The defendant's application for a variance from this rule had 
encountered strong opposition from neighboring property owners, 
but the building corporation went ahead with construction with-
out obtaining the variance. The project was actually completed 
during the zoning litigation.73 The plaintiffs, the owners of neigh-
boring buildings, then filed a public nuisance action.74 The plain-
tiffs contended that the building did not comply with the set-back 
ordinance, deprived their property of access to light and air, and 
thus constituted a public nuisance.75 Ruling that the plaintiffs had 
standing to bring the suit, the court found the building corpora-
tion liable for creating a public nuisance. 76 The court issued a 
mandatory injunction requiring the completed building modified 
to comply with the set-back ordinance. 77 
The Welton court engaged in two distinct processes of balancing 
the equities. When ruling on whether the defendant was liable for 
a public nuisance, the court gave great weight to the corporation's 
bad faith.78 The court was unwilling to balance the financial 
equities as framed by the defendant. The defendant argued that 
the cost involved in modifying the finished building would be 
greatly disproportionate to the slight diminution of the value of 
the plaintiffs' property.79 The court refused to accept this argu-
ment, asserting that this approach would effectively allow the 
defendant to escape full liability by completing construction in 
bad faith. 80 
fill material placed in a state-protected great pond appropriate if private plaintiff estab-
lishes special damages). In order to have standing to bring an action against a public 
nuisance, an individual citizen must show that he has sustained "special damages" 
distinct from the harm caused to the public at large. See generally Bryson & Macbeth, 
supra note 61, at 250-58. 
71 70 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1934). 
72 [d. at 378. 
73 [d. at 379. 
74 [d. at 377-78. 
75 [d. 
76 [d. at 381. 
77 [d. at 383. 
78 See id. at 379. 
7. [d. at 381. 
80 [d. at 382. 
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When discussing its decision to grant a restoration order, how-
ever, the Welton court shifted its attention from the defendant's 
conduct to the necessity of enforcing public policy.8l Reasoning 
that zoning regulations must be preventative in order to be effec-
tive, the Welton court identified the overwhelming factor in its 
decision to issue the mandatory injunction as "that immeasurable 
but nevertheless vital element of respect for, and compliance 
with, the health ordinance of the city."82 The court ordered the 
building modified to restore the plaintiffs' access to light and air 
as guaranteed under the zoning code. 83 
While bad faith on the part of the defendant is often present in 
public nuisance cases in which mandatory injunctions are is-
sued,84 a restoration order may also be simply the most effective 
solution for an existing violation. Heinl v. Pecher,85 a Pennsyl-
vania case, involved a solid waste incinerator plant built in a 
residential area in violation of local zoning. In this case, the court 
asserted that ordering the incinerator plant removed, in order to 
restore the residential character of the locale, was no more drastic 
than permanently enjoining the plant's operation.86 "[T]here is no 
injustice in ordering its removal, for it was not built as a land-
scape ornament; it was built for use. It would be idle for equity to 
stay its hand until the plant was operated.'f87 Restoration orders 
and prohibitory orders are simply alternative forms of injunctive 
relief. 
81 See id. at 381, 383. 
82 Id. at 383. 
..... 
; 
83 Id. But see Injunctions, supra note 2, at 1005, noting that the alterations were never 
made. The author of that note characterizes Welton as an example of how an injunction 
can enable a plaintiff to "extort a money settlement disproportionate to the harm." I d. 
The cost of modifying the twenty story building was set at $343,837.00, and the case was 
decided in 1934, during the Depression. "The plaintiff apparently sold his right to 
enforcement for more than he could have obtained in compensatory damages." Id. 
However, a careful reading of the case indicates that this analysis is inaccurate. The 
Welton opinion as a whole is aimed at resisting the argument that the only values 
involved in the controversy were private, financial ones, and that all the 'equities' were 
reducible to monetary terms. A close reading of the opinion indicates that the court was 
concerned with protecting the residential use of the small landowners from forced sale to 
the building corporation, and with giving effect to the zoning code. See Welton at 381, 389. 
84 E.g., Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 139 P.2d 976 (1943); McCarie v. DeLucca, 
233 Minn. 372, 46 N.W.2d 873 (1951); Higgins v. Builders Fin., 20 N.C. App. 1, 200 S.E.2d 
397 (1974). 
85 330 Pa. 232, 198 A. 797 (1938). 
86 Id. at 236, 198 A. at 799. 
87 ld. at 237, 198 A. at 799. See' also Seekonk v. Anthony, 339 Mass. 49, 157 N.E.2d 651 
(1959) (when offending building cannot be put to any lawful use, court may order it 
removed). 
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Trespass and nuisance are designed to protect land; nuisance, 
in particular, seeks to protect those qualities of land that are 
valuable and useful to the owner. The public nuisance action 
arose as a way of promoting public safety, health, and welfare. 
The restoration order originated in these common law causes of 
action. Similar concerns-the need to protect land and natural 
resources of all types, and to protect the public from harmful 
pollutants-are the bases of environmental legislation. The rest 
of this article will examine the injunction to restore as an envi-
ronmental enforcement tool. 
III. THE RESTORATION ORDER AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
REMEDY 
Before the enactment of state and federal environmental pro-
tection legislation, common law actions were the only vehicles for 
advancing environmental claims. Indeed, one of the reasons for 
enacting environmental laws was because private litigation was 
inadequate to protect the public interest inherent in natural re-
sources.88 Drawing upon the use of injunctive relief in common 
law nuisance,89 Congress and the state legislatures made injunc-
tions available in the civil enforcement sections of most environ-
mental protection laws. 90 The statutory language typically leaves 
the form of enforcement injunctions to be decided on a case-by-
case basis.91 It seems reasonable to conclude that the courts' 
traditional equitable discretion to fashion effective, complete re-
lief in particular factual situations has been enlisted in the envi-
rontnental protection effort. The restoration order ought to be 
part of the judicial enforcement arsenal. 
State courts readily apply common law nuisance precedent to 
interpret environmental protection statutes.92 The facts of a stat-
utory enforcement suit brought under a civil enforcement provi-
sion state a cause of action for public nuisance as well. This 
similarity allows state courts to carry common law principles and 
88 See S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 3668. 
89 See S. Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5019. See also infra text and notes at notes 251-57. 
90 E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1982) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act); N.Y. ENVTL. 
CONSERV. LAW § 71-1931 (McKinney 1973) (New York Water Pollution Control Law). 
91 See infra text and notes at notes 97-127, 226-57. 
92 See,e.g., State ex rel. Stream Pollution Control Bd. V. Town of Wolcott, _ Ind App.--o 
433 N.E.2d 62 (1982). See also infra text and notes at notes 97-127. 
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forms of relief over from nuisance precedent to environmental 
enforcement suits. The next section of the article will examine the 
types of state environmental cases in which restoration orders 
have been issued. 
While the federal courts' equity powers are comparable to the 
state courts', their common law powers are more narrowly cir-
cumscribed.93 The limitations bearing upon federal courts' power 
to apply common law in the environmental area have been em-
phasized in recent Supreme Court doctrine.94 Hence the issue of 
whether the restoration order continues to be available in federal 
environmental enforcement suits, as it was in common law nui-
sance suits, is complex. The final section of the article will exam-
ine the validity of the restoration order as a federal environmen-
tal enforcement remedy. 
A. Injunctions to Restore in State Environtnental Enforcement 
Suits 
Injunctions to restore have been used in cases brought under 
state environmental protection laws. State courts draw upon 
common law nuisance precedent to interpret state environmental 
legislation.95 As in public nuisance actions, the validity of a resto-
ration order in an environmental enforcement suit does not hinge 
upon who has brought the suit. Injunctions to restore have been 
granted in cases brought by private plaintiffs as well as in cases 
initiated by the government.96 As in public nuisance cases, the 
restoration order in statutory enforcement cases is grounded on 
the need to protect the public interest. 
The issue of whether a restoration order was available under 
Indiana environmental laws was squarely presented in State ex 
rel. Stream Pollution Control Board v. Town of Wolcott. 97 In this 
case, the state Stream Pollution Control Board brought suit 
against the Town of Wolcott under two state environmental stat-
utes, the Indiana Environmental Management Act (EMA)98 and 
93 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). See infra text and notes at notes 
155-225. 
94 E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
95 See, e.g., Ryan v. Commonwealth, 30 Pa. Commw. 180, 373 A.2d 475 (1977). 
96 Compare Eyde v. State, 393 Mich. 453, 225 N.W.2d 1 (1975) with State ex rei. Stream 
Pollution Control Bd. v. Town of Wolcott, _ Ind. App. ---' 433 N.E.2d 62 (1982). 
97 Wolcott, _ Ind. App. ---' 433 N.E.2d 62 (1982). 
98 IND. CODE §§ 13-7-1-1 to 13-7-19-3 (1982). 
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the Refuse Disposal Act,9!I in order to force the town to clean up a 
municipal dump. In the trial court, the town argued that since the 
EMA's section on solid waste merely stated that "[n]o person may 
operate or maintain an open dump,"loo the legislature intended 
only to prohibit the active operation of open dumps in the fu-
ture.101 Since the site had been officially closed, the town argued 
that it was not operating an open dump and not violating the 
EMA.102 The trial court, agreeing with the town's interpretation, 
ruled that courts were not empowered by the EMA to order 
clean-up or restoration of sites formerly used for open dumping.lO:l 
The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the courts' 
power to enforce the EMA did extend to restoration orders. 104 The 
appellate court disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of 
the statutory proscription against operating or maintaining open 
dumps, and rejected the town's contention that simply by closing 
the dump site to future use the town was in compliance with state 
environmental law.105 
The court of appeals examined the section prohibiting open 
dumps in the Refuse Disposal Act, 106 which declared that "[fJailure 
to comply with this section constitutes a nuisance inimicable to 
human health." 107 The court then ruled that "in the context of 
nuisance, passive as well as affirmative conduct is included within 
the meaning of the word 'maintain'." 108 The court held that the 
EMA authorized it to abate existing open dumps by issuing resto-
ration orders based on the procedures prescribed in regulations 
governing sanitary landfill operations. 109 The restoration order in 
Wolcott served to implement a specific state environmental pro-
tection goal. 
A restoration order was granted in an environmental suit 
brought by an individual citizen of Michigan in Eyde v. State. 110 In 
Eyde, the state had obtained an easement to build a sewer line 
"" IND. CODE §§ 36-9-30-1 to 36-9-31-23 (1982). 
100 IND. CODE § 13-7-4-1 (1982). 
101 Wolcott, at -. 433 N.E.2d at 64. 
102 Id. at _, 433 N.E.2d at 66. 
103 Id. at .-. 433 N.E.2d at 64. 
104 Id. at _, 433 N.E.2d at 67. 
105 Id. at _, 433 N.E.2d at 66. 
106 Id. 
107 IND. CODE § 36-9-30-35 (1982). 
lOS Wolcott at _, 433 N.E. at 66-67. 
Hl9 Id. at 67. 
110 393 Mich. 453, 225 N.W.2d 1 (1975). 
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across the plaintiff's land in a condemnation proceeding. III The 
plaintiff then commenced an action under the Michigan Envi-
ronmental Protection Act (Michigan EPA), 112 charging that the 
ill-conceived sewer project would not only harm local streams but 
also lead to far-reaching water pollution. 11:3 
Unlike the Indiana statutes at issue in Wolcott, 114 the Michigan 
EPA makes no reference to the word "nuisance." 115 The Michigan 
law does provide, in expansive terms, for citizen enforcement 
suits "for declaratory or equitable relief ... for the protection of 
the air, water, and other natural resources and the public trust 
therein from pollution, impairment, or destruction." 116 
In the Eyde case, the Michigan Supreme Court asserted that 
the state environmental protection act gave individual citizens a 
sizeable share of the initiative for enforcement l17 and agreed with 
the plaintiff that pollution from the planned sewer project would 
flow downstream, eventually reaching Lake Michigan. 118 The 
court reinstated the county court's restoration order, which ap-
pointed a Master to formulate an alternative sewer plan and 
oversee the restoration of the plaintiff's property to its original 
condition. 119 
A restoration order has also been used to enforce state envi-
ronmentallaw in the area of toxic waste. In Village of Wilsonville 
v. SeA Services, Inc.,12o the Illinois Supreme Court drew upon 
common law nuisance principles to interpret the Illinois Envi-
ronmental Protection Act. 121 The court affirmed a lower court's 
mandatory injunction requiring the defendant site operator to 
"restore and reclaim" 122 the site. 
There was no issue of bad faith on the part of the disposal site 
operator in Wilsonville; the result hinged upon conflicting federal 
and state environmental regulations. The disposal site was duly 
licensed and followed up-to-date landfill techniques, but was 10-
III Id. at 454, 225 N.W.2d at 2. 
112 MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West 1979). 
11:l Eyde, 393 Mich. at 455-56, 225 N.W.2d at 3. 
1I4 See infra text and notes at notes 97-109. 
1I; See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West 1979). 
1I6 MICH COMPo LAWS ANN. § 691.1202 (1979). 
1I7 Eyde, 393 Mich. at 454, 225 N.W.2d at 2. 
1I8 Id. at 455-56, 225 N.W.2d at 3. 
1I9Id. 
120 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981). 
121 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll1V2 §§ 1001-1051 (1979). 
122 86 Ill. 2d at 6, 31, 426 N.E.2d at 827, 839. 
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cated above an extensive abandoned mine shaft. l23 After the dis-
posal site had been licensed by the federal Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, the Illinois legislature passed an amendment to the 
Environmental Protection Act explicitly prohibiting the location 
of hazardous waste disposal sites above mine shafts. 124 
Finding it highly probable that the Wilsonville site would bring 
about substantial injury,125 the court held that an injunction re-
quiring the defendant operator to exhume and remove the toxic 
waste, along with any contaminated soil, was "the best and safest 
alternative." 126 As the court explained, "One distinguishing fea-
ture of equitable relief is that it may be granted upon the threat 
of harm that has not yet occurred .... [S]ince the likelihood exists 
that great harm will be done if the materials are not moved, it 
seems only reasonable that the materials must be taken some-
where safer than where they are now deposited."127 
In sum, in state environmental protection suits, restoration 
orders are not confined to enforcement actions brought by gov-
ernmental plaintiffs or to circumstances where a defendant has 
acted in bad faith. The remedy has been used as an effective tool 
for protecting public safety and the public interest in natural 
resources. By requiring a defendant to take affirmative steps to 
clean up an open dump, replant trees removed in the construction 
of a poorly-designed sewer line, or remove toxic waste from an 
unsafe disposal site, a restoration order simultaneously brings a 
defendant's conduct into compliance with state law and repairs 
the environment. 
B. The Restoration Order in Federal Environmental Law 
1. Early Federal Environmental Precedent 
Before the enactment of federal environmental protection legis-
lation, there were a few federal common law nuisance cases in 
which environmental claims were asserted. 128 Most of these cases 
12:1Id. at 7-9, 426 N.E.2d at 827-28. 
124 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l11lh § 1021(g). See Wilsonville, 86 Ill. 2d at 18, 426 N.E.2d at 832. 
125 86 Ill. 2d at 26-27, 426 N.E.2d at 836-37. 
126 I d. at 36, 426 N .E.2d at 841. 
127 I d. at 26, 426 N.E.2d at 836 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 90 at 603 (4th ed. 1971». 
128 See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 288 U.S. 496 (1906); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 
U.S. 365 (1923). See generally Bleiweiss, Environmental Regulation and the Federal 
Common Law of Nuisance: A Proposed Standard of Preemption, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
41 (1983). 
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involved disputes between neighboring states, and were decided 
by the Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction of interstate 
controversies. 129 Because the complainant states sought injunc-
tive relief, these early cases were equity suits decided by a process 
of 'weighing the equities.'l30 For example, in Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper CO.,t31 decided in 1907, the State of Georgia sought an . 
injunction against a copper plant located across the state line 
whose emissions were damaging Georgia farmland. 132 The Su-
preme Court balanced the equities and held that it was "a fair and 
reasonable demand on the part of [Georgia] that the air above its 
territory should not be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous 
acid gas .... "133 In Tennessee Copper, as in the rest of these early 
federal common law nuisance decisions, the Supreme Court took 
the same approach to determining the outcome of a nuisance 
action as state courts; 134 the legal standard or rule of decision 
applied was a common law "reasonableness" standard. 135 
The history of the restoration order as an environmental rem-
edy in federal court began with United States v. Republic Steel 
COrp.,l36 decided in 1960. Republic Steel was not a common law 
nuisance action, but rather a suit brought under the Rivers and 
Harbors Act. 137 This statute was enacted in 1899 to protect navi-
gation,l36 and prohibits releasing refuse 139 and creating obstruc-
tions l40 in navigable waters. The government alleged that steel 
tailings released by the company's plant into a navigable river 
and accumulating on the riverbed violated the Rivers and Har-
129 U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, eLl. The Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdic-
tion of controversies between two or more states, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(aXl) (1982), and original 
but not exclusive jurisdiction over actions brought by one state against citizens of 
another state, id. at § 1251(b)(3). 
130 See supra note 128. 
131 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
132 Id. at 236. 
133 I d. at 238. 
134 See id. at 239-40 (Harlan, J., concurring) (Court should apply the same principles 
and rules of equity that would apply in a factually similar suit wholly between private 
parties). See also In re Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312, 322 n.9 ("[T]here does not 
appear to be any substantial difference between these federal common law principles 
and the New York law of common nuisance (non-criminal)."). 
135 See Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 238. 
136 362 U.S. 482 (1960). 
137 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-426(m) (1982) (as amended). 
138 See Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U.S. 410, 427 (1902). 
139 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982). 
140 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982). 
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bors Act.141 The government contended that the accumulating 
pollutants impaired the navigable capacity of the river and 
sought an injunction requiring the steel company to dredge and 
remove them. 142 
The Supreme Court adopted the government's liberal interpre-
tation of the Rivers and Harbors Act's protection of navigable 
waters, permitting the 1899 law to serve as a vehicle for environ-
mental protection. I4.3 The Court quoted Justice Holmes' admoni-
tion in an earlier case that "a river is more than an amenity, it is a 
treasure."I44 The Court ruled that the steel company's release of 
industrial waste constituted a violation of both the refuse and the 
obstruction sections of the statute. 145 
The Court also affirmed the trial court's mandatory injunction 
ordering the steel company to dredge the deposits and restore the 
navigable capacity of the river. 146 The Court reasoned that since 
discharging the pollutants and creating the obstruction in the 
river were proscribed by federal law, an injunction to repair the 
damage was an appropriate remedy. 147 Otherwise, said the Court, 
"we impute to Congress a futility inconsistent with the great 
design of this legislation." 148 Another section of the statute 
explicitly authorized injunctions to remove illegal structures. 149 
The Court asserted that Congress had made its purpose clear, 
providing "enough law ... from which appropriate remedies may 
be fashioned .even though they rest on inferences."I50 
Republic Steel's approach to the question of remedies set a 
pattern for fashioning environmental relief under the Rivers and 
Harbors Act. 151 In a Rivers and Harbors Act case decided seven 
years later, the Court said "The government may, in our view, 
seek an order that a negligent party is responsible for rectifying 
the wrong done .... Denial of such a remedy would permit the 
result, extraordinary in our jurisprudence, of a wrongdoer shift-
141 362 U.S. at 483. 
142 [d. at 483-84. 
I"" [d. at 487. 
144 [d. at 491 (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1930)). 
145 362 U.S. at 489, 491. 
146 362 U.S. at 492. 
147 [d. 
148 [d. 
149 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1982). 
150 362 U.S. at 492. 
151 See United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964); Wyandotte 
Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 514 
F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1975). See infra text and notes at notes 351-66. 
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ing responsibility for the consequences of his negligence onto his 
victim." 152 Environmental restoration orders continue to be issued 
under the Rivers and Harbors Act. 15.1 
However, since Republic Steel was decided in 1960, Congress has 
enacted sweeping legislation that now imposes a pervasive regu-
latory scheme in the field of environmental protection. This 
scheme is founded on comprehensive national standards govern-
ing the release of pollutants. The federal courts' role in enforcing 
these standards is explicitly set out in the civil enforcement provi-
sions of each statute. While most federal environmental laws 
provide for enforcement actions for injunctive relief, the question 
whether restoration orders continue to be available as they were 
in common law nuisance actions and Rivers and Harbors Act 
suits is complex. 
2. The Restoration Order as a Remedy Under Federal 
Environmental Protection Statutes 
Because of the restoration order's heritage in common law 
nuisance and federal environmental precedent that antedated 
most environmental protection legislation, its use by a federal 
court might appear to run afoul of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions that comprehensive environmental statutes impliedly pre-
empt federal common law. 154 This section of the article will argue 
that this particularly suitable form of relief is available in federal 
courts. In order to reach this conclusion, however, it is important 
to examine both federal common law and the implied preemption 
doctrine. 
a. Federal Common Law 
The Supreme Court repudiated the idea of "federal general 
common law" in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. l55 Since Erie, 
however, courts and commentators have recognized the validity 
of federal specialized common law. l56 Federal jurisdiction in Erie 
152 Wyandotte Transp. Co., 389 U.S. at 204. 
I"J See infra text and notes at notes 354-65. 
154 E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
155 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
156 See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Note, Exceptions to 
Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 966 (1946); 
Friendly,lnPraise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 
(1964). 
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was founded on diversity.157 Federal specialized common law has 
developed in cases where federal jurisdiction is based on the 
existence of a federal question. l58 Specifically, the Supreme Court 
has recognized the validity of federal specialized common law in 
areas presenting an overriding federal interest 159 or the need for 
uniform national rules of decision.160 
Another recognized form of federal specialized common law 
consists of statutory construction. 161 One of the most basic func-
tions of federal courts is filling the interstices of federal statutory 
law. 162 Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in D'Oench, Duhme & 
CO. V. FDIC 163 is often cited for this proposition: 
The federal courts have no general common law .... But that 
is not to say that wherever we have occasion to decide a 
federal question which cannot be answered from federal 
statutes alone we may not resort to all the source materials 
of the common law .... 164 
Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would 
be impotent. This follows from the recognized futility of at-
tempting all-complete statutory codes .... 165 
Federal common law implements the federal Constitution 
and statutes, and is conditioned by them. 166 
Restoration orders fall into this category of federal judicial 
lawmaking. The role of the federal courts is to apply broadly 
drafted legislation in individual cases. 167 Particularly since the 
merger of law and equity in 1934,168 federal courts are authorized 
to grant both legal and equitable relief in order to 'implement'169 
[57 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982); 304 U.S. at 65. 
[58 E.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938); Board 
of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-52 (1939). 
[59 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
[60 Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
[6[ See Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478-79 (1888)(When construing the Constitution 
and federal statutes, federal courts are "evolving a true common law dependent upon 
national authority."). 
[62 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 244 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973). 
[63 315 U.S. 447, 465 (1942). 
[64 I d. at 469. 
[65 Id. at 470. 
[66 Id. at 472. 
[67 See HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
ApPUCATION OF LAW (Tent. ed. 1958). 
[66 Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982». 
[69 D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 472. 
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federal legislation. Federal courts bear "a heavy responsibility to 
tailor the remedy to the particular facts [of each case] so as to best 
effectuate"170 Congressional enactments. 
Under traditional equity doctrine, the particular form that in-
junctive relief will take in a given case is a matter for the court's 
equitable discretion.171 Modern courts interpret this as a require-
ment that they make an independent assessment of the circum-
stances of the case in order to formulate an appropriate and 
effective remedy.172 Many federal regulatory laws explicitly au-
thorize injunctive relief in civil enforcement suits. 173 Presumably, 
when Congress simply authorizes federal courts to issue injunc-
tions to enforce a statute, it has left the determination of what 
form such injunctions will take to the court's reading of the 
statute and assessment of the facts of each case. 174 
However, the precise wording of the civil enforcement provi-
sions in federal environmental laws varies; 175 it is unclear to what 
extent Congress intended to limit or displace federal courts' 
equitable discretion concerning remedies. 176 One might begin to 
analyze this displacement issue in the context of environmental 
legislation by invoking three longstanding rules of statutory in-
terpretation.177 First, Congress is presumed to be aware of exist-
ing common law when enacting new legislation. 178 Second, "[t]he 
Supreme Court has long been committed to a presumption that 
statutes encroaching upon the common law retain familiar and 
long-established principles." 179 Third, "especially when a statute is 
170 Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 377 U.S. 115, 130 (1965). 
171 See infra text and notes at notes 11-12. 
172 See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 185 (1910). See also 
cases cited infra note 44. 
173 E.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987, at §§ 6928, 
6972, 6973 (1982). See infra text and notes at notes 226-40. 
174 E.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944) ("[T]he federal courts are given 
jurisdiction to issue whatever order to enforce compliance is proper in the circumstances 
of each particular case."); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940) 
("The power to enforce implies ... the power to utilize any of the procedures normally 
available to the litigant according to the exigencies of the particular case.") 
175 See infra text and notes at notes 226-40. 
176 See Collins, The Dilemma of the Downstream State: The Untimely Demise of Federal 
Common Law Nuisance, 11 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 297, 316-17 (1984). See generally 
Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524 (1982). 
177 This approach is taken by Lind, Umbrella Equities: Use of the Federal Common Law 
of Nuisance to Catch the Fall of Acid Rain, 21 URB. L. ANN. 143, 168-69 (1981). 
178 See United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 707-08 (1961). 
179 Lind, supra note 177, at 168. See Isbrandtsen & Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 
(1952). 
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of a remedial ... nature the Court hesitates to repeal by implica-
tion existent common law remedies.''180 This approach would not 
challenge federal courts' traditional equitable discretion to fash-
ion remedies and would affirm the restoration order, as it has 
developed in common law, as an apt and viable environmental 
enforcement remedy. However, two recent Supreme Court deci-
sions have announced a new doctrine governing the relationship 
of federal common law and comprehensive environmentallegisla-
tion. This implied preemption doctrine appears to cast doubt upon 
the continued availability of the restoration order. 
b. The Implied Preemption Doctrine of City of Milwaukee v. 
Illinois 
The Supreme Court has taken a newly restrictive approach to 
federal common law in two recent decisions. In City of Milwaukee 
v. Illinois 181 and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National 
Sea Clammers Association,182 the Court held that the comprehen-
siveness of federal environmental legislation evinces Con-
gressional intent to preempt federal common law. 183 A brief exam-
ination of these two decisions is necessary in order to assess the 
preemption doctrine's impact upon the environmental restoration 
order. 
The Milwaukee case involved an interstate pollution dispute. 184 
The State of Illinois alleged that inadequately treated sewage, 
discharged by Milwaukee into Lake Michigan and carried by lake 
currents into Illinois waters, threatened the health of Illinois 
citizens. l85 The state instituted a common law nuisance action, 
and petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the case under its 
original jurisdiction of controversies between states. l86 In Illinois 
v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1),187 the Court declined to exercise its 
original jurisdiction 186 but ruled that the dispute was a case 'aris-
180 Lind, supra note 177, at 168-69. See Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 
204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907); United States v. Ashland Oil Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 
1974). 
181 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
182 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
183 E.g., id. at 22. 
184 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. See supra note 129. 
187 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
188 Id. at 108. 
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ing under' federal law for the purposes of general federal question 
jurisdiction. 189 Reasoning that the national environment was an 
area of overriding federal concern in which the development of 
federal common law was justified,l90 the Court held that Illinois' 
common law public nuisance claim presented a federal question 
adjudicable in federal district court. 191 The Milwaukee I Court 
declared, "When we deal with air and water in their ambient or 
interstate aspects, there is federal common law."I92 The Mil-
waukee I decision gave lower federal courts jurisdiction to decide 
common law nuisance actions involving air or water pollution. 19,3 
Milwaukee I explicitly recognized that federal environmental 
common law would be subject to the paramount authority of 
Congress. 194 
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regula-
tions may in time preempt the field of federal common law 
nuisance. But until that time comes to pass, federal courts 
will be empowered to appraise the equities of suits alleging 
creation of a public nuisance by water pollution. 195 
The case was remanded to the district court for a decision on the 
merits. 196 
Soon after Milwaukee I was decided, Congress enacted the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, or the Clean 
Water Act (CW A). 197 The CW A established a pervasive regulatory 
scheme aimed at wholly eliminating the discharge of pollutants 
into the nation's waters by 1985.198 The CWA prohibits the dis-
charge of pollutants except in compliance with a permit issued by 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 199 
While lllirwis v. Milwaukee was pending, the City of Milwaukee 
was issued permits under the Clean Water Act for the discharges 
at issue in the federal nuisance suit. 2°O When the case again 
189 I d. at 99. 
100 Id. at 101-07. 
191 Id. at 107. 
192 Id. at 103. 
193 Id. at 107. See generally Note, Federal Common Law and Water Pollution: Statutory 
Preemption or Preservation? 40 FORD. L. REV. at 501-2; Bleiweis, supra note 128, at 45-48. 
194 Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91 at 107. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 108; on remand 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973), 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979). 
197 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982». 
198 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982). 
199 I d. at § 1311(a). 
200 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1981). 
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reached the Supreme Court, the Court ruled in favor of Mil-
waukee, stating that "no federal common law remedy was avail-
able" to Illinois.201 In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II),z02 
the Court noted Milwaukee l's recognition of the potential 
preemption of federal common law nuisance203 and announced: 
Congress has not left the formulation of appropriate federal 
standards to the courts through application of often vague 
and indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity 
jurisprudence, but rather has occupied the field through the 
establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program 
supervised by an expert administrative agency. 204 
The Court held that Milwaukee l's federal common law of inter-
state water quality had indeed been preempted by the com-
prehensive Clean Water Act. 205 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, articulated a doctrine 
of implied preemption based upon the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers.206 Separation of powers dictates that it is for 
Congress, not the courts, to make federal law. 207 Federal common 
law is merely an expedient, resorted to only when a federal ques-
tion cannot be answered from federal statutes alone.208 Justice 
Rehnquist cast this in the form of a presumption against federal 
common law in any area where Congress has spoken: 
[W]hen the question is whether federal statutory or federal 
common law governs, . . . evidence of a clear and manifest 
purpose [to displace common law] is not required .... [W]e 
start with the assumption that it is for Congress, not federal 
courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied 
as a matter of federallaw. 209 
Where Congress has occupied the field with a comprehensive 
legislative scheme, like the CW A, 210 existing common law is im-
pliedly preempted.211 
201 I d. at 332. 
202 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
203 I d. at 310. 
204 Id. at 317. 
205 I d.; see also id. at 320. 
206 See id. at 312-17. 
207 See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 164 (1978). 
208 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314. 
209 Id. at 316-17. 
210 Id. at 317. 
2[[ See id. at 315, 319. 
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The presumption against the survival of federal common law 
announced in Milwaukee II can only be rebutted with evidence of 
an affirmative Congressional intention to preserve common 
law.212 Justice Rehnquist examined the evidence presented by 
Illinois and ruled that the Clean Water Act and its legislative 
history did not demonstrate the requisite legislative intent to 
preserve common law. 213 
The Court applied Milwaukee II's implied preemption doctrine 
in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clam-
mers Association (Sea Clammers). 214 In this case, the plaintiff 
Association sought compensatory and punitive damages for the 
harm done to fishing grounds in the vicinity of New York harbor 
by sewage released by several surrounding municipalities.215 The 
Association invoked "a wide variety of legal theories,"216 including 
federal common law nuisance, as bases for its damages claim. The 
Court ruled that the Association had no federal cause of action 
because "the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water 
pollution is entirely preempted by the more comprehensive scope 
of the [CW A] .... "217 
The Court went on to summarily extend the preemption doc-
trine to another federal statute,218 the Marine Protection, Re-
search and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA),z19 without engaging 
in the careful sifting of statutory language and legislative history 
performed by the Milwaukee I I Court. The MPRSA is aimed at 
eliminating ocean dumping of pollutants. The Court asserted in 
Sea Clammers that since the regulatory scope of the MPRSA was 
no less comprehensive than the CWA scheme,220 any federal com-
mon law in the area of off-shore water pollution was impliedly 
preempted.221 
212 Id. at 315 n.s. See also In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 335-44 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(presumption against the survival of federal common law is rebuttable). See also gener-
ally Bleiweiss, supra note 128, at 50-54. 
213 See Milwaukee 11,451 U.S. at 319-32. Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, also 
analyzed the CWA and its legislative history, reaching the opposite conclusion as to 
Congress' intention to displace the federal common law of nuisance. Id. at 339-53. 
214 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
215 I d. at 4-5. 
216 Id. at 5. 
217 Id. at 22. 
2181d. 
219 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1982). 
220 Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 22. 
221 Id. 
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The contours of the implied preemption doctrine after Sea 
Clammers are unclear.222 In Sea Clammers, the Court did not 
examine the statutory language or legislative history of the 
MPRSA before concluding that the statute preempted federal 
common law.223 Federal courts have since held that further envi-
ronmental statutes preempt federal common law in other areas of 
environmental protection.224 One court has held that the Clean 
Water Act preempts state common law claims brought in federal 
court against non-resident polluters.225 Because the restoration 
order originated in common law trespass and nuisance, and was 
used by federal courts in early environmental cases antedating 
most of the federal environmental legislation in force today, it is 
vulnerable to attack as a vestige of the common law that Mil-
waukee I I intended to overrule. 
The rest of this section of the article argues that the restoration 
order is still valid in federal environmental enforcement suits. 
First, the evidence of Congress's affirmative intent to preserve 
the restoration order will be presented. The article will then argue 
that the restoration order should survive Milwaukee II and Sea 
Clammers because it is a form of relief, not a judge-made rule of 
decision. 
3. Congressional Intent to Invoke the Full Panoply of Injunctive 
Relief in Federal Environmental Legislation 
Most environmental laws provide for civil enforcement actions 
for injunctive relief. 226 Such civil enforcement provisions may be 
categorized into three types. Most federal environmental laws 
provide for (a) civil actions by the EPA to enforce the regulatory 
222 See Bleiweiss, supra note 128, at 55-63. 
22.1 See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 21-22. 
224 See, e.g., United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982) (Clean Air 
Act); United States v. Waste Indus., 556 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act). 
225 Chicago Park Dist. v. Sanitary Dist. of Hammond, 530 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
See generally Trauberman, Common Law Nuisance in Hazardous Waste Litigation: Has 
It Survived Milwaukee II? 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 1043 (1983). 
226 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(b), 7523, 7603, 7604 (1982); Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-3(b), 300h-2(b), 300j-8 (1982); Marine Protection, Research 
and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1415(g) (1982); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b), 
1364(a), 1365(a) (1982); Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7920(a)(5) 
(1982). 
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scheme set up by the statute,227 (b) civil actions by citizens, typi-
cally defined to include states,228 to restrain violations of regula-
tions, EPA permits, or EPA orders,229 and (c) civil actions by the 
EPA for immediate relief against "imminent hazards," or emer-
gency situations.230 A comparison of the language used by Con-
gress in these three types of provisions indicates that while Con-
gress may have intended to limit the forms of injunctive relief 
available in general enforcement and citizen suits, it clearly in-
tended not to limit the federal courts' traditionally broad equita-
ble power to fashion relief against imminent hazards.231 
The judicial enforcement scheme of the Clean Air Act (CAA)232 
provides an example. The CAA contains two general enforcement 
sections, one that applies to the emission standards for stationary 
sources233 and one for the standards for moving sources.234 In 
another section, the CAA provides for citizen suits "to enforce an 
emission standard or EPA order."235 The CAA's Emergency Pow-
ers provision,236 on the other hand, broadly authorizes injunctive 
relief "to immediately restrain any person causing or contributing 
to" an imminent and substantial endangerment of public health 
or to require him ''to take such action as may be necessary ."237 The 
Clean Water Act,236 Safe Drinking Water Act,239 and Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act240 all follow a similar scheme and 
employ similar language. 
227 E.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1982) (enforcement actions to restrain 
violations and enforce compliance). 
228 See, e.g., Resource Conservation anq, Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(15), 6972 (1982) 
[hereinafter cited as RCRA]. 
229 E.g., id., § 6972 (1982) (citizen suits to enforce permits, regulations, or orders). 
230 E.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1982) (emergency powers); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6973 (1982) (imminent hazard). 
231 See generally Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws (pt. 2), 
14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10063, 10079 (1984). 
232 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). 
233 Id. at § 7513(b). 
234 I d. at § 7523. 
235 Id. at § 7604. 
238 Id. at § 7603. 
237 Id. 
238 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). 
239 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-10 (1982). 
240 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982). The notion of a restoration order under the Clean Air 
Act seems absurd. Congress' use of the same general wording in all environmental 
emergency powers sections, however, is evidence of how much discretion Congress 
expected the courts to exercise when framing enforcement orders. 
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The restoration order is a particularly suitable remedy in the 
area of hazardous waste. Evidence of Congress' intention to pre-
serve the availability of this type of injunction is apparent in the 
structure and language of federal hazardous waste laws. The 
legislative histories of the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA)241 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)242 also demonstrate 
that Congress intended to incorporate the full range of injunctive 
relief used at common law into these statutes' enforcement 
schemes. 
RCRA was designed to regulate hazardous waste "from cradle 
to grave."243 RCRA is comparable to the Clean Water Act and the 
Clean Air Act; it regulates the disposal of pollutants on land. 
RCRA's Hazardous Waste Management scheme244 provides for 
comprehensive, national regulation of hazardous waste 
generators, transporters, and disposal sites.245 Embedded within 
this scheme is a general enforcement provision for policing these 
regulations through EPA compliance orders, criminal fines, and 
civil penalties.246 RCRA also contains a citizen suit section for civil 
actions to enforce regulations, permits, standards, or EPA or-
ders.247 RCRA's imminent hazard section,248 by contrast, broadly 
authorizes EPA suits against any practice which "may present an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the envi-
ronment."249 The federal district courts are authorized to restrain 
the dangerous practice or order "such other action as may be 
necessary."250 
The legislative history of the RCRA Amendments of 1980251 
shows that Congress was not merely aware of existing common 
law remedies but drew upon and intended to codify them in 
241 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987. 
242 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 [hereinafter cited as CERCLA]. 
243 H. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 6119, 6120. 
244 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934 (Subch. III) (1982). 
245 Id. 
246 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1982). 
247 I d. at § 6972. 
248 I d. at § 6973. 
24·Id. 
250 Id. at § 6961. This section subjects federal hazardous waste facilities to the RCRA 
scheme in the same manner as any other facility, and withholds immunity "with respect 
to the enforcement of any such injunctive relief." 
251 Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987). 
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RCRA and in other federal environmental legislation. 252 The Sen-
ate Committee Report25.3 explains that certain additions were 
made to RCRA's hazardous waste generator provision in order to 
codify existing common law duties in the substantive require-
ments of the federal statute.254 The Report also specifically ad-
dresses the role of common law remedies in the imminent hazard 
provision, which was also amended: 
Like other imminent and substantial endangerment provi-
sions in environmental statutes ... § [6973] is essentially a 
codification of common law public nuisance remedies. The 
Congress made this intent clear as early as 1948 when, in 
section 2(d) of the Water Pollution Control Act (the forerun-
ner of pres~nt day imminent hazard provisions), it expressly 
declared that "the pollution of interstate waters ... which 
endangers the health or welfare of persons ... is hereby 
declared to be a public nuisance .... " 
§ [6973] therefore incorporates the legal theories used for 
centuries to assess liability for creating a public nuisance ... 
and to determine appropriate remedies in common law. 255 
The Report states that because Congress intended to liberalize 
common law requirements for equitable relief the courts should 
252 See S. Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5019. 
2:;;3 Id. 
254 I d. at 5021. 
255 Id. at 5023 (emphasis added). Although the Committee here uses the word "liabil-
ity," it is important to recall that this passage deals with the imminent hazard provision 
of RCRA, not the liability provision of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982), which enables 
the government to recover money-damages for cleanup costs and injuries to the envi-
ronment. 
The Committee's reference to "centuries" of common law invites the inference that 
Congress does not differentiate between state and federal common law, at least in the 
context of common law nuisance. Indeed, the principles of nuisance originated in En-
gland. See supra note 62; McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common 
Law, 1 U. FLA. L. REV. 27 (1948). An argument could be made that Congress was 
"adopting" common law nuisance remedies in environmental statutes. In Wheaton v. 
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 223 (1834) the Supreme Court said, "[T]here can be no common law 
of the United States .... There is no principle which pervades the Union, and has the 
authority of law, that is not embodied in the constitution or laws of the Union. The 
common law could be made a part of our federal system only by legislative adoption." Id. 
at 229. 
For the proposition that the common law public nuisance action is part of the body of 
law transplanted to this country from England, see Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Bel-
mont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 563-64 (1851). This proposition was rejected, with 
respect to areas in which Congress has not legislated, in Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. 
Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 (1887). 
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not construe the provision solely with reference to common law. 256 
Imminent hazard provisions simply invoke federal courts' tradi-
tional equitable power. 257 
The Third Circuit has followed this interpretation of federal 
environmental laws' imminent hazard provisions in United States 
v. Price. 258 This case involves a landfill site discovered to be the 
source of toxic chemicals which were contaminating the public 
water supply of Atlantic City, New Jersey.259 The EPA sued for 
injunctive relief under the imminent hazard sections of both 
RCRA260 and the Safe Drinking Water Act. 261 
The Price court noted that, applying common law criteria, a 
mandatory injunction requiring the defendants to commission a 
study to determine how best to cure the landfill site's leaking 
problem would be valid preliminary relief against an actively 
harmful condition.262 The court then said that the language and 
legislative history of RCRA, as noted above, constituted clear 
evidence of Congress's intention to confer upon federal courts full 
authority to grant mandatory injunctions to the extent necessary 
to eliminate risks posed by hazardous waste. 26.3 "There is no doubt 
that [RCRA] authorizes the clean-up of a site, even a dormant 
one, if that action is necessary to abate a present threat to the 
public health or the environment."264 
CERCLA 265 was enacted to launch a national effort to locate 
and clean up inactive or "dormant" hazardous waste sites266 like 
the one involved in the Price case. Congress determined that 
2S6 [d. 
257 [d. See also United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1142 (D. Conn. 1980). 
258 688 F.2d.204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'g 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981). 
259 688 F.2d at 209. . 
260 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982). 
261 42 U.S.C. § 300i (1982). 
262 688 F.2d at 212. A preliminary injunction serves to maintain the status quo pending 
a final decision on the merits. The Price court cited Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. Co. v. 
Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 730 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893) for the proposition that, depending upon 
whether the status quo is a condition of rest or of action, a defendant may be required to 
take affirmative steps in order to preserve it. 
263 688 F.2d at 214. 
264 [d. The Price case has not yet reached trial. Under a cal.e management order issued 
May 31,1984, the issue of remedies will be tried before the issue ofliability. United States 
v. Price, 20 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2229 (D.N.J. May 31, 1984). 
265 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). 
266 See H. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.1,reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 6119. 
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RCRA was inadequate to deal with the inactive site problem 
because RCRA applies to closed or abandoned sites "only to the 
extent that they are posing an imminent hazard .... "267 While a 
major component of the CERCLA scheme is federal funding for 
clean-up efforts,268 Congress did not intend CERCLA to replace 
private clean-up activities. 269 
Many parts of CERCLA provide evidence of Congress' intention 
to add to, but not replace, common law remedies.270 For example, 
twice within CERCLA's liability provision271 Congress made feder-
ally permitted releases of certain substances immune from liabil-
ity under the statute but clearly stated, "Nothing in this para-
graph shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liability 
of any person under any provision of State or Federal law, includ-
ing common law, for damages or for removal or remedial ac-
tion . ... "272 CERCLA's emergency powers provision, entitled 
"Abatement Actions,"273 also demonstrates Congress' intention to 
invoke the federal courts' broad and flexible equity power. In 
situations involving imminent danger to public health, welfare, or 
the environment the federal government may sue "to secure such 
relief as may be necessary to abate such danger .... "274 In these 
suits the federal courts "shall have jurisdiction to grant such 
relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may 
require."275 
While federal environmental laws no longer expressly declare 
pollution a "public nuisance" subject to "abatement,"276 they do 
evince Congress' intention to codify and preserve common law. 
The broad language used to define equitable relief against immi-
nent hazards in particular indicates that federal courts should be 
287 [d. at 6125. 
268 [d. 
2'19 [d. at 6120. 
270 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9614 (1982) (relationship to other law), 9607(i)(j) (1982) (preserving 
non-CERCLA bases of liability), 9609 (1982) (emergency injunctive relief), 9651(e) (com-
missioning a study of existing common law remedies), 9652 (1982) (savings clause pre-
serving rights under other laws). 
271 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982). 
272 42 U.S.C. § 9607(i)(j) (1982) (emphasis added). See also id. at § 9652, a savings clause 
preserving remedies under other federal and state law, including common law. Compare 
the savings clause in the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) 
(1982), which was interpreted in Milwaukee II to apply to the citizen's suit section only, 
and not to the preemptive effect of the CWA as a whole. See 451 U.S. at 327-32. 
273 42 U.S.C. § 9673 (1982). 
274 [d. 
275 [d. 
276 See S. Rep. No. 172, supra note 252, 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 5023. 
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permitted to exercise their traditional equitable discretion when 
fashioning relief against emergencies. Statutory language and 
legislative history show that Congress affirmatively intended to 
incorporate the full range of injunctive relief usually available in 
federal courts into the enforcement scheme of environmental 
protection legislation. The restoration order ought to be available 
in statutory environmental enforcement actions as it was at 
common law. 
4. The Restoration Order Survives Milwaukee II's Implied 
Preemption Doctrine 
The section above presented evidence that many parts of fed-
eral environmental legislation codify and preserve the remedies 
available under common law, including federal common law. 
Where Congress has authorized "such relief as may be neces-
sary,"277 or "such relief as the equities of the case may require,"278 
the question of what particular decree is proper in each case 
"cannot be answered from statutes alone."279 Congress intended 
federal courts to continue the interstitial lawmaking of formulat-
ing effective relief to "implement"280 environmental statutes. 
This section will outline an alternative approach by arguing 
that the implied preemption doctrine of Milwaukee II and Sea 
Clammers 281 does not even apply to the restoration order. A close 
examination of federal common law cases leading up to the Mil-
waukee II decision, and of subsequent preemption cases, indicates 
that the preemption doctrine ought to be limited to federal com-
mon law causes of action and rules of decision and should not 
extend to forms of relief. 
The distinction between rules of decision and causes of action, 
on the one hand, and forms of relief, on the other, is discernible in 
many cases.282 Rules of decision are "the laws which are applied by 
277 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1982) (Clean Air Act). 
278 33 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1982) (Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act). 
279 D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469 (1942)(Jackson, J., concurring); see 
also Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314. 
280 D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 472. 
281 See supra text and notes at notes 206-213. 
282 E.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) ("substantive right" distin-
guished from "equitable remedy"). See also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1945); J. 1. 
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). One 
commentator distinguished "primary" from "remedial" law. See Note, The Federal 
Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1523 (1969). "While the distinction between the 
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courts to determine [the outcome] of questions put before 
them."283 The rule of decision in a case determines the question 
whether particular conduct falls under the condemnation of a 
particular statute.284 Forms of relief, by contrast, govern the ex-
tent and nature of the legal consequences of conduct condemned 
by a particular statute.285 As one commentator put it, federal 
specialized common law is valid in the area of "the formulation of 
remedies for the breach of duties imposed by federal law." 286 
The term "cause of action" is also difficult to define, but it too 
has been distinguished from forms of relief.287 A party has a cause 
of action when statutorily prohibited conduct has invaded some 
interest of his own, thus entitling him to invoke the power of the 
courtS.288 By contrast, "relief is a question of the various remedies 
a federal court may make available. A plaintiff may have a cause 
of action even though he be entitled to no relief at all .... "289 A 
litigant would have a cause of action yet be entitled to no relief 
when his claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
for example. 290 
right and remedy is difficult, primary rights may be defined as consisting of provisions 
describing what is to happen if a directive arrangement is successful. Remedial law 
consists of provisions specifying the consequences of noncompliance with the relevant 
primary provisions." [d. at 1523. 
283 Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428 n.6 (1960). 
284 Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 
COLUMBo L. REV. 1025, 1027 (1967) (analysis of Sola Electric CO. V. Jefferson Electric Co., 
317 U.S. 173 (1942». 
285 [d. Accord Deitrick V. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-1 (1940). 
286 Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1523. (1969). 
287 Bivens V. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
288 See Davis V. Passman, 442 U.S. at 236-39. "If a litigant is an appropriate party to 
invoke the power of the courts, it is said that he has a 'cause of action' under the statute." 
[d. at 239. This right to invoke judicial redress is different from the injury-in-fact 
requirement involved in the issue of standing. [d. 
289 442 U.S. at 239 n.18. 
290 [d. These distinctions are made more murky by the fundamental ambiguity in the 
term "remedy." A "remedy" can be a cause of action, that is, the means of obtaining legal 
redress,or a form of relief, that is, the end a litigant seeks by going to court. See generally 
Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in 
Bell V. Hood, 117 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (1968). 
Many of the cases articulating the distinction between rights and remedies involve 
judicially implied private causes of action under federal statutes. In these cases, the 
term "remedy" means cause of action. E.g., J. I. Case CO. V. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
Nevertheless, even Borak, the leading case on judicially implied private actions under 
federal statutes, kept the main issue, of an implied private cause of action, distinct from 
the subsidiary issue of what relief would be available in an implied private action. See id. 
at 435. Recent Supreme Court doctrine on judicially implied rights of action is restrictive, 
based on the rationale that the federal courts cannot themselves enlarge their own 
1985] ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ORDERS 205 
The Supreme Court's first decision in the Milwaukee litigation, 
IUinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1),291 declared that common law 
public nuisance cases involving air and water pollution were ad-
judicable by federal district courtS.292 By proclaiming this new 
category of cases 'arising under' federal law,293 Milwaukee I in 
effect expanded federal courts' federal question jurisdiction. 294 
Milwaukee I essentially sanctioned a new federal cause of action. 
The federal specialized common law of nuisance announced by 
the Court in Milwaukee I derived from interstate resource con-
troversies involving water rights or pollution.296 These early fed-
eral common law cases were equity suits because the complainant 
states sought injunctive relief;296 since at that time there were no 
federal statutes governing these areas, the Court applied common 
law principles to decide these controversies.2!11 Thus, in early fed-
eral pollution nuisance precedent the issues of whether the facts 
alleged constituted a nuisance and of what relief should be 
granted were both matters for the court's equitable discretion. 298 
Milwaukee I was such an interstate controversy.299 The Su-
preme Court's opinion specified that federal common law envi-
ronmental suits would be "equity suits in which the informed 
judgment of the chancellor will largely govern."300 The federal 
district courts were empowered to "appraise the equities"301 in 
jurisdiction. Under article III, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts is controlled by Congress. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. 
v. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
291 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
2112 Id. at 103. See supra text and notes at notes 184-93. 
293 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982). 
29< See supra text and notes at notes 191-2. 
295 Among the cases cited in Milwaukee I are Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), 
Hinderlider v. LaPlata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), and New Jersey v. 
New York, 345 U.S. 369 (1963), which involved appropriating water rights; and Missouri 
v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901), Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), and 
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921), which involved pollution. Federaljurisdic-
tion in these cases derived from the existence of an interstate controversy. 
296 See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 244 (1901). 
2f1I See, e.g., Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237-8; Hinderlider, 304 U.S.tat 110. 
296 See, e.g., Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg., 289 U.S. 334 (1933). 
299 See Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 93. After Milwaukee I, the federal courts were divided 
on the question whether federal common law nuisance was limited to interstate con-
troversies. See genemlly Comment, Fedeml Common Law of Nuisance Reaches New High 
Water Mark as Supreme Court Considers Illinois v. Milwaukee II, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. 
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 10101 (1980). 
300 406 U.S. at 108. 
301 Id. at 107. 
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order to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the pollution 
involved constituted a public nuisance.302 If so, it followed under 
common law that the court would again weigh the equities to 
fashion appropriate relief. 303 
The justification given by the Milwaukee II Court for resorting 
to federal common law was the need for federal protection of the 
national public interest in the environment.304 Shortly after Mil-
waukee I was decided, the Congress enacted legislation with the 
same goal. The Clean Water Act305 subjected water pollution to a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme based on uniform national 
water quality standards.306 The new legislation also provided for 
"swift and direct" enforcement of these national standards 
through administrative orders, civil monetary penalties, and 
"rapid access to the federal district courts .... "307 A potential 
conflict within federal law emerged between statutory enforce-
ment suits implementing Clean Water Act standards, on the one 
hand, and federal common law suits decided according to the 
court's appraisal of the equities on the other. 
Both Milwaukee II ,308 the Supreme Court's second opinion in the 
Milwaukee litigation, and Middlesex County v. National Sea 
Clammers Association 309 were federal common law nuisance ac-
tions and each case raised a direct conflict with the terms of 
federal statutory law. In Milwaukee II, the city sewerage author-
ity had been issued federal permits, based on Clean Water Act 
standards, by the EPA for the discharges the State of Illinois 
alleged constituted a public nuisance.31o In Sea Clammers, the 
plaintiff Association was pursuing a federal common law nui-
sance action in order to recover damages,311 a form of relief Con-
gress deliberately made unavailable to private plaintiffs under 
federal environmental statutes.312 
The issue at the heart of Milwaukee II was what standard 
302 [d. 
303 406 U.S. at 108 n.l0. 
304 [d. at 101-03. 
305 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982». 
300 See S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 3668. 
307 [d. at 3729-31. 
308 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
309 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
310 See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 319-20. 
311 See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 4-5. 
3[2 See id. at 17, n.27. 
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ought to govern the City of Milwaukee's sewage discharges: a 
Clean Water Act standard embodied in the EPA permit, or a 
federal court's common law 'appraisal of the equities.'31a The Su-
preme Court held, based on separation of powers, that it was for 
Congress, not federal courts, "to articulate the appropriate stan-
dards to be applied as a matter of federallaw."314 Justice Rehn-
quist wrote, "[t]he problem of effluent limitations has been 
thoroughly addressed through the administrative scheme estab-
lished by Congress .... [F]ederal courts lack authority to impose 
more stringent effluent limitations under federal common law 
than those imposed by the agency charged by Congress with 
administering this comprehensive scheme."315 
As first articulated and applied by the Supreme Court in Mil-
waukee II, then, the implied preemption doctrine involved a legal 
standard or rule of decision. When the Court concluded that "no 
federal common law remedy was available"316 to the State of 
Illinois, the Court was using the word "remedy" to denote a cause 
of action, not to refer to a form of relief. Milwaukee II did not 
involve forms of relief. 
The issue at the heart of Sea Clammers was whether the plain-
tiff Association had a cause of action for damages in federal 
court.317 The Clean Water Act expressly allows citizen suits for 
injunctive relief to enforce federal water quality standards.318 The 
plaintiff Association contended that it should be allowed to pursue 
a federal common law action, for damages, as an alternative to 
the statutory citizen's suit.319 The Court was unwilling to allow a 
federal common law nuisance action for damages based upon an 
environmental statute whose own terms expressly limited private 
enforcement to injunctive relief. 320 
The Sea Clammers decision involved a conflict between com-
mon law and statutory causes of action; the result did not hinge 
upon the issue of forms of relief. The opinion as a whole discusses 
doctrine concerning private causes of action implied under federal 
313 See Milwaukee 11,451 U.S. at 317. 
314 [d. at 320, 325 n.l8. 
315 [d. at 317. 
316 [d. at 332; see also id. at 315 n.8. 
317 See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 10. 
318 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982). 
319 453 U.S. at 15. 
320 [d. at 16. 
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statutes,321 and granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,322 and concludes 
that the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision is the exclusive 
means of private enforcement of federal water quality standards 
in federal court.323 As articulated and applied by the Supreme 
Court in Milwaukee II and Sea Clammers, then, the implied 
preemption doctrine simply does not reach the federal judicial 
lawmaking involved in fashioning relief against statutory viola-
tions.324 
One current environmental case exemplifies this limitation on 
the scope of the implied preemption doctrine. In Illinois v. Out-
board Marine Corp. (OMC),325 the State of Illinois alleged that 
Outboard Marine's plant had been discharging wastewater con-
taining polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBS)326 into Lake Michigan 
since 1959.327 The state instituted a federal common law nuisance 
suit, based on Milwaukee I, seeking an injunction that would 
require OMC to dredge contaminated soil from an area of the 
lakebed near OMC's plant.328 
At first, the legal argument focused on federal common law 
nuisance as a cause of action. OMC argued that a Milwaukee I suit 
had to be based on an interstate dispute.329 Illinois countered that 
the pollution of an interstate body of water was sufficient basis for 
a federal common law nuisance action.330 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on this question.331 However, after holding in 
Milwaukee II that the Clean Water Act preempted federal com-
mon law nuisance in the area of water pollution, the Court va-
cated the Seventh Circuit's decision of Outboard Marine and re-
manded the case for consideration in light of Milwaukee II. 332 The 
321 Id. at 13-18. 
322 I d. at 19-21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides for a federal civil action on behalf of any 
person deprived, under color of state law, of any "rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution or laws" of the United States. 
323 I d. at 21-22. 
324 See also United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982) (Clean Air Act 
preempts federal common law claim for damages). 
325 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated mem., 453 U.S. 917 (1981), rev'd in part 690 F.2d 
473 (7th Cir. 1982), on remand sub nom United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 549 F. 
Supp. 1032, 549 F. Supp. 1036, 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
326 PCBs are highly toxic chemicals. See 619 F.2d at 624 n.1. 
327 619 F.2d at 624-25. 
326 Id. 
32. Id. 
330 See United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473 at 474 (7th Cir. 1982). 
331 453 U.S. 917 (1981) (mem.). 
332 Id. 
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court of appeals then ruled that Illinois' common law nuisance 
action was indeed preempted by the Clean Water Act. 333 
Meanwhile, the federal EPA had instituted an enforcement 
action against OMC under the Clean Water Act. 334 The EPA 
brought suit under the statute's general enforcement provision,335 
alleged a statutory violation based on the same facts as the State 
of Illinois' nuisance action, and sought the same injunctive re-
lief.336 The Seventh Circuit permitted the state to intervene in this 
statutory suit. 337 
On remand to the district court,338 OMC raised the preemption 
doctrine again.339 0MC argued that any "judge-made remedy"340 
ordering the clean-up of soil contaminated with PCBs was. 
'preempted' by the Clean Water Act's government clean-up sec-
tion.341 The statute's enforcement scheme includes a section au-
thorizing the government to clean up extremely hazardous sub-
stances and then recover costs from polluters.342 
The district court ruled that the preemption doctrine did not 
govern, nor even aid, interpretation of the Clean Water Act's 
enforcement provisions.343 The general enforcement provision 
which formed the basis of the government's suit authorized "ap-
propriate relief, including a temporary or permanent injunc-
tion .... "344 The district court held that this provision and the 
government clean-up and recovery scheme cited by OMC were 
simply alternative remedies. 345 The court said the statutory lan-
333 United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1982). The district 
court has also held that Monsanto Corp., supplier of the PCBs, cannot be held liable in an 
action based on the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982) (part of the Rivers and Harbors Act 
of 1899). See 549 F. Supp. 1032 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
3.'l4 See 680 F.2d at 480. 
335 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1982). 
336 Outboard Marine, 680 F2d at 480. The EPA later amended the complaint to add 
claims against OMC under the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982), see 549 F. Supp. 1036 at 
1037-41, and under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a), see 556 F. Supp. 54. 
337 See 680 F.2d at 480-81. 
338 United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
339 ld. at 1039, 1042. 
340 ld. 
34! 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982); see 549 F.Supp. at 1042. 
342 33 U.S.C. § 1265 (1982) authorizes the government to expend up to $15,000,000 to 
remove in-place pollutants; § 1321 authorizes the government to clean up certain dis-
charges pursuant to a detailed regulatory plan and then recover cleanup costs from the 
polluters. See 549 F. Supp. at 1043. 
343 United States v. Outboard Marine, 549 F. Supp. at 1043. 
344 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1982). 
345 Outboard Marine, 549 F. Supp. at 1043. 
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guage of the general enforcement section was broad enough to 
include a clean·up order, a form of relief "designed mainly to avoid 
future violations or to abate continuing violations."346 In sum, the 
Outboard Marine court rejected the defendant's attempt to apply 
the preemption doctrine as a way of limiting the relief available in 
a statutory enforcement suit. 347 
The Outboard Marine court's approach illustrates how the un· 
certain contours of the preemption doctrine ought not extend to 
the very provisions of environmental protection statutes. Con· 
gress drafted these environmental laws to include a variety of 
enforcement mechanisms;348 judicial enforcement by means of 
injunctions is a vital component of this comprehensive statutory 
scheme.349 Simply because "the need for a federal common law 
cause of action to further the federal interest in clean water no 
longer exists,"350 it does not follow that the need for forms of relief 
developed at common law to protect natural resources has also 
disappeared. 
Nor should the preemption doctrine be seized upon to shield 
conduct that violates federal law. The implied preemption doc· 
trine is based upon the principle of separation of powers, that is, 
on the limited function of the federal courts to interpret and 
implement the laws which Congress makes. The doctrine should 
not be so broadly applied as to impinge upon this constitutionally 
circumscribed function. 
5. Current Restoration Orders Issued Under the Rivers and 
Harbors Act 
The restoration order is an apt and effective remedy for viola· 
tions of federal environmental law because it responds directly to 
the resulting ecological damage. A restoration order requires the 
violator to undo the effects of his misconduct, carrying the goal of 
environmental protection laws into effect. In Republic Steel,351 the 
Supreme Court affirmed an order, granted under the Rivers and 
346 [d. at 1043-44. 
347 [d. 
348 See infra text and n,otes at 226-50. 
349 See supra note 226. See also S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1972 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3668. 
350 Note, Federal Common Law and Water Pollution: Statutory Preemption or Preser-
vation? 49 FORD. L. REV. 500, 513 (1981). 
351 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960). 
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Harbors Act,352 which required the steel company to remove ac-
cumulated pollutants from the bottom of a navigable river. The 
Court reasoned that this remedy carried into effect the statutory 
prohibitions against releasing refuse and creating obstructions in 
navigable waters. 353 
The Rivers and Harbors Act gives the Army Corps of Engineers 
regulatory power over navigable waters; the Corps issues permits 
for private dredge and fill projects.354 The Corps takes conserva-
tion and environmental factors into consideration when deter-
mining whether to grant a permit, and may refuse to authorize a 
project on environmental grounds.355 The Corps of Engineers 
often seeks restoration orders against developers who have un-
dertaken dredge and fill projects without the required permit. 356 
In these cases, restoration decrees have evolved into a principled, 
individualized mechanism for remedying violations of federal en-
vironmental law. 
The evolution of the restoration order into a sensitive and 
principled environmental remedy under the Rivers and Harbors 
Act began with United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc. 357 In Sunset 
Cove the Ninth Circuit ruled that a restoration order requiring 
the defendant to remove all the landfill material it had deposited 
illegally was unfair.358 Such extensive restoration was simply 
more costly than the defendant could bear.359 The court of appeals 
modified the lower court's order to require removal of only so 
much of the landfill as would "permit nature, in a reasonable 
period of time, to take its course and approximately re-establish 
former topographic conditions."360 In Sunset Cove, the Ninth Cir-
cuit recognized that the equitable origin of mandatory injunc-
tions to restore requires that courts tailor a decree that is both 
effective and feasible for the defendant to carry out. 
352 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-466g-1 (1982). 
353 [d. See also Converse v. Portsmouth Cotton Oil Refining Corp., 281 F. 981 (4th Cir. 
1922). See also infra text and notes at 136-52. 
354 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982). 
355 See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970). 
356 See, e.g., United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 514 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1975); United 
States v. Board of Trustees of Florida Keys Comm. College, 531 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla. 
1981). 
357 514 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1975). 
358 [d. at 1090. 
359 [d. 
360 [d. 
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Several Fifth Circuit cases involving development projects in 
Florida wetland areas have elaborated on the Sunset Cove ap-
proach to environmental restoration orders.361 The Fifth Circuit 
recognizes restoration as an appropriate remedy against devel-
opers who have done dredging or filling work without authoriza-
tion from the Army Corps of Engineers. However, the court of 
appeals requires that restoration decrees be based on a careful 
factual inquiry into both ecological conditions as well as the prac-
ticalities of each case.362 
Under the Fifth Circuit's approach, the trial court conducts a 
full hearing on the issue of restoration.363 Each side presents a 
detailed plan.364 The court evaluates both proposals and chooses a 
restoration plan that will (1) "confer maximum environmental 
benefits" (that is, undo or reverse ecological harm without entail-
ing more extensive tampering with existing conditions than nec-
essary); (2) "be achievable as a practical matter" (that is, be 
feasible and cost-effective); and (3) "bear an equitable relationship 
to the degree and kind of wrong which it is intended to remedy" 
(that is, be proportionate to the severity of the defendant's mis-
conduct.)365 
This approach articulates criteria for a court's 'weighing of the 
equities' to formulate relief against a wrongdoer. These criteria 
fulfill traditional notions of judicial equitable power as "the in-
strument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the pub-
lic interest and private needs .... "366 Restoration decrees issued to 
enforce the Rivers and Harbors Act under this approach map out 
how the defendant will bring his conduct into compliance with 
federal law. In practice, then, as well as in theory, the restoration 
order can be an environmental remedy that responds to the type 
361 United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976); Weiszmann 
v. United States, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976), on remand, 545 F. Supp. 721 (S.D. Fla. 
1982); United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331 (M.D. Fla. 1980); United States v. Board of Trustees 
of Florida Keys Comm. College, 531 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
362 See, e.g., Weiszmann, 526 F.2d at 1304. 
383 See, e.g., Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1342. 
38< ld. 
365 ld. at 1343. See also Sexton Cove, 526 F.2d at 1301. 
366 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). Moreover, each trial court's application 
of the three criteria outlined in United States v. Weisman to each fact pattern fosters 
principled, rational decisionmaking as well as the development of a body of remedial 
caselaw. See genemlly Winner, supra note 12 passim; Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking 
Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299, 1309 (1977). 
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of wrongdoing involved in each particular violation and also ac-
complishes the larger goal of the federal environmental protec-
tion scheme by repairing ecological damage. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Since the first days of serious concern for the environment, 
traditional legal devices have been put to new uses in order to 
protect the public interest inherent in natural resources. At first, 
common law tort actions designed to protect interests in land, like 
trespass and nuisance, were the only vehicles for environmental 
claims. The mandatory injunction to restore originated in these 
common law forms of action as a effective way to end compelling 
harm to land. A restoration order places the burden upon the 
wrongdoer to take those actions that are necessary to undo the 
effects of his misconduct. The restoration decree was also recog-
nized as a suitable remedy against a common law public nuisance. 
A restoration order carries into effect the public policy embodied 
in laws designed to protect public health and welfare. Similar 
concerns-the need to protect land and all forms of natural re-
sources, and the need to protect the public interest-underlie 
environmental law. 
The restoration order originated in the common law precedent 
from which environmental law developed. Congress and the state 
legislatures made injunctive relief available to enforce environ-
mental protection laws. Hence the restoration order could be put 
to use as an environmental enforcement tool. A restoration de-
cree is a way of providing relief in individual environmental suits 
which responds to both the defendant's misconduct as well as the 
ecological damage which the defendant's misconduct has caused. 
Restoration orders ought to be available to enforce state and 
federal environmental protection statutes. State courts readily 
draw upon common law nuisance precedent in cases brought 
under state environmental laws. Restoration decrees have been 
issued by state courts in a variety of contexts. Federal environ-
mental laws also provide for civil enforcement actions for injunc-
tive relief. Despite the Supreme Court's restrictive view of federal 
common law in the environmental area, the restoration order 
ought to continue to be available in federal statutory enforcement 
suits as it was in common law and early federal environmental 
cases. Rather than displacing the federal courts' equitable discre-
tion to fashion effective remedies, federal environmental legisla-
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tion w.as designed to incorporate the full panoply of injunctive 
relief into the comprehensive federal environmental enforcement 
scheme. The restoration order can develop into a principled and 
sensitive remedy for violations of environmental protection laws. 
